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This paper attempts to explain possible reasons and objectives behind 35 trillion yen (7% of 
GDP) interventions conducted by the Japanese monetary authorities from January 2003 to 
March 2004, and to discuss whether interventions achieved presumed objectives, made the 
movement of the yen flexible but orderly, and helped economic recovery. The motivation of 
starting intervention in January 2003 was to keep the yen from appreciating in the midst of 
financial and macroeconomic weakness.  The economy started to show some strength in the 
second half, but interventions continued, with a brief pause of interventions in September.  
Reasons for interventions after September are two-fold.  First, interventions provided 
opportunities of unsterilized interventions. Second, the monetary authorities were extremely 
sensitive to speculative activities in the market.
1. Introduction 
The Japanese monetary authorities (the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan) 
intervened in the yen/dollar market, selling 35 trillion yen, during the 15-month period from 
January 2003 to March 2004.  The size of interventions were unusually large, reaching 7 
percent of GDP, and exceeding the total amount of interventions during the 11-year period 
from April 1991 to December 2002.  Why did intervention by the Japanese authorities reach 
such a large amount?  
 This paper attempts to explain possible reasons and objectives behind interventions 
conducted by the Japanese monetary authorities in 2003 and 2004, and to discuss whether 
interventions achieved presumed objectives, made the movement of the yen flexible but 
orderly, and helped economic recovery to take place.  In the discussion of interventions, it is 
necessary to pay a significant attention to macroeconomic conditions as well as the exchange 
rate movements, as decisions of interventions should be understood in the context of 
macroeconomic conditions at the time.  When the 15-month episode of interventions started 
in January 2003, the Japanese economy was in a very weak condition.  Several major banks 
were regarded in the market to be near-insolvent if proper accounting and evaluation of assets 
were applied.1 The economic growth rate was very low, and deflation was getting worse. The 
stock prices were going down sharply. The motivation of starting intervention in January 
2003 was to keep the yen from appreciating in the midst of financial and macroeconomic 
weakness.  The stock prices continued to decline until April, and the economy looked quite 
fragile in the spring.   
 The economy started to show some strength in the second half, but interventions 
continued, with a brief pause of interventions in September.  Reasons for interventions after 
                                                  
1 In order to clear the 8% capital adequacy standard, major banks were relying on deferred tax assets, 
which have zero liquidation value. What revealed in the subsequent failures of Resona Bank in May 2003 
and revelation of large losses of UFJ Bank, solvency of some of the major banks in the spring of 2003 was 
quite doubtful.   
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September are two-fold.  First, interventions provided opportunities of unsterilized 
interventions. Second, the monetary authorities were extremely sensitive to speculative 
activities in the market. Whenever the net long positions of the yen in the futures market 
turned long, interventions were conducted.  This continued until March 2004. The 
intervention stopped in the mid-March, and the yen stayed at around the level of the last day 
of intervention until the time of this writing (October 2004).  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Interventions and the 
macroeconomic conditions from a broader perspective will be described in Section 2. More 
micro probe into intervention strategies will be conducted in Section 3. Sections 4 will 
attempt to explain the reasons for heavy interventions from January 2003 to March 2004, and 
Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Macroeconomic Conditions 
Repeated recessions have long plagued Japan since the burst bubble in the early 1990s.  The 
average growth rate between 1992 and 2003 is about 1 %, compared to the average of 4% 
from mid-1970s to 1992.  Between 1992 and 2003, there are three times that economic 
growth rate exceeded 2.5%, or roughly a recovery speed.  The recovery of 1996 was 
followed by low growth and a banking crisis in 1997-98. The growth rate of 1998 was 
negative. The recovery of 2000, partly fueled by IT bubble was followed by another recession 
in 2001 and negative growth rate in 2002.  The recovery of 2003 is the third attempt to get 
back on a growth track in the last ten years.2  Although there were a few times that the 
growth rate exceeded 3%, the recovery was followed by the recession.  In 1998 and 2002, 
the growth rate became negative, first time since 1974, which was the year after the first oil 
crisis.  Financial crisis and economic slump reinforced each other from 1998 to 2002.  
                                                  
2 See Bayoumi and Collyns (2000) and Callen and Ostry (2003) for IMF views on factors explaining poor 
macroeconomic performance of the Japanese economy in the 1990s. Ito and Mishkin (2004) analyzed the 
role of monetary policy for the slow growth of the decade.  
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 Let us look at the developments of macroeconomic fundamentals from 2001 to June 
2004. Table 1 is the opening paragraphs of monthly reports of the Bank of Japan during this 
period.  I attached the numerical value to each paragraph as my interpretation of the Bank of 
Japan interpretation of the direction of the economy at the time.  The Bank of Japan was 
most concerned about the decline in economic activities from December 2001 to February 
2002.  The rest of 2002, the Bank of Japan maintained very cautious in assessing the 
economic situations, although the decline had been stopped: “Japan’s economy has stabilized 
as a whole” (Monthly Report, October 2002 to January 2003), “Economic activity remains 
flat” (Monthly Report, February to May 2003), and “Economic activity remains virtually flat” 
(Monthly Report, June-September 2003).  The assessment became slightly positive only in 
October 2003: “Japan’s economy is recovering gradually” (Monthly Report, October 2003).  
The assessment became more optimistic only in April 2004: “Japan's economy continues to 
recover gradually, and domestic demand is becoming firmer.” The history shows that the 
Bank of Japan was most concerned about the health of the economy from June 2001 to May 
2002, and remained non-optimistic until September 2003.  This is important in assessing 
appropriateness of interventions if interventions were conducted to help economic recovery. 
 
[Table 1: Views of the Bank of Japan on the economy] 
 
Now, let us look at the macroeconomic indicators, and compare those indicators with 
the intervention timings.  Table 2 shows, among others, the monthly (percent) changes in 
stock prices and the yen/dollar rate; quarterly growth rate, inflation rate, and the Bank of 
Japan view that was created in Table 1. These are relevant variables that may help explain 
intervention behavior as well as other policy actions. Interventions between January 2001 and 
December 2002 are concentrated in two clusters, one in September 2001, and another in 
May-June 2002.  The September 2001 episode can be explained by yen appreciation (4.7 % 
in August 2001) with the background of very weak macro fundamentals (negative growth and 
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sharp declines in stock prices (20% in three months from May to August 2001).  The Bank 
of Japan view on the economy was quickly turning pessimistic.  Indeed, yen appreciation 
when macro fundamentals are weakening was regarded as inappropriate.  Intervention in 
September 2001 was to fight against movement of the exchange rate that is not consistent 
with macro fundamentals.  Similarly, the economy was regarded as very weak as the growth 
rate had been in the negative territory for four quarters in a row prior to May 2002, and the 
Bank of Japan view on the economy was still very pessimistic.  Yen appreciation by ten 
percent in three months during the period of the weak economy was again considered to be 
harmful to the continuous economic recovery.  Therefore rapid appreciation during the weak 
economy, which was considered to be movement in the wrong direction, prompted 
interventions.  In short, interventions in September 2001 and May-June 2002 can be 
understood as the officials sending a strong signal that the market was wrong to appreciate 
the yen when macroeconomic fundamentals were weak.  
 
[Table 2: Macro Fundamentals] 
 
Ito (2003; 2004a) showed that there were two different regimes of interventions since April 
1991, the beginning of the period that data are disclosed. The first regime, April 1991 to June 
1995, is characterized by small-scale, frequent interventions, the second regime, from June 
1995 to December 2002, by large-scale, infrequent interventions.  He attributed to the 
difference to the deliberate switch of strategy by Mr. Sakakibara, who became Director 
General in June 1995. The Sakakibara strategy was succeeded by Mr. Kuroda became in 
charge of intervention in July 1999.  Mr. Kuroda retired on January 14, 2003, and was 
succeeded by Mr. Mizoguchi.  The third regime started with Mr. Mizoguchi intervening on 
January 15, 2003, the first intervention of what would become the third regime—large-scale, 
frequent interventions. Table 3 summarizes the total amounts of intervention, the number of 
intervention days, the minimum and maximum of interventions, sorted by quarters from 
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2001:I to 2004:II.  
 
[Table 3:  Intervention Regimes before and after January 2003] 
 
The two interventions, September 2001 and May-June 2002, were typical of the 
Sakakibara-Kuroda interventions.  When the foreign exchange market is considered to be 
heading in the wrong direction—wrong judged from macro-fundamentals—and the 
movement is too rapid, then interventions were employed with large amounts to send strong 
messages.  
 The new type of intervention, under Mr. Mizoguchi, started in January 2003 
continued until March 2004.  During the fifteen months, macroeconomic fundamentals 
continued to become brighter.  In the beginning of 2003, the Japanese economy was at 
precarious position.  Stock prices were declining and economic activities were “flat.” Nikkei 
stock price index went down to 7,600, one-fifth of the peak that was recorded in thirteen 
years earlier.3  The decline in the stock prices weakened many financial institutions that held 
large amounts of equities on their balance sheets.  The mood was near crisis, and any help, 
including interventions preventing the yen appreciation, was welcome and justifiable.  From 
January to March 2003, interventions in an attempt to stop yen appreciation when the 
economy was weak were understandable, although the frequency of interventions was much 
higher than experiences under the Sakakibara-Kuroda regime (1995-2002).  Interventions 
from May to August 2003 were conducted when the economy started to show signs of 
recovery. The GDP growth rate of the second quarter of 2003 was more than 4%, although it 
was not until August that the figure was known to the public.  The Bank of Japan view of 
the economy was still “virtually flat” from June to September 2003. The CPI inflation rate 
was rising from minus 0.8 in January 2003 to minus 0.1% in August 2003. This was another 
                                                  
3 Since the index composition has been changed, the direct comparison of the Nikkei number of 2003 to 
that of 1989 is not totally accurate.  
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sign that the worst had been over, but it was uncertain at the time to make such a judgment. 
Despite large-scale interventions, the yen appreciated from 119 yen/dollar in the beginning of 
2003 to 107 yen/dollar at the end of 2003. The interventions from January to December 2003 
can be characterized as an operation to prevent sharp yen appreciation that might have 
prevented the economy from getting back on a recovery track. Interventions moderated the 
speed of yen appreciation, while the flexibility of the exchange rate was maintained. 
Interventions of 2003 bought time until the economy recovered and the stock prices rose to a 
comfortable level. 
 The Bank of Japan view was pointing out a “gradual recovery” from October 2003 
to May 2004.  The stock prices were also rising in this period. The mood was definitely 
brighter for many of the industries at end-2003, compared to a year earlier.  In retrospect, 
the Japanese economy was making a strong recovery, in terms of growth rate, in the fourth 
quarter of 2003 and the first quarter of 2004—7.6% and 6.4%, respectively—but that 
information was not available in real time.4
 At the time of this writing (October 2004), the Japanese economy seems to be finally 
getting out of a long stagnation. Growth rate is nearing what many consider the potential rate. 
Deflation is also almost over. But, recovery is driven by exports and fixed investment.  
Consumption is yet to grow strongly.  
 
3.  Interventions in 2003-2004: How did it start and how did it end? 
Intervention on January 15, 2003, first time in six months, was carried out without notice of 
the market. The amount was 8.3 billion yen (or about 70 million dollars), a very small 
amount for the Japanese interventions. The interventions was conducted without 
announcement or an intentional or unintentional leak.  Interventions were conducted in 8 
                                                  
4 The first estimate of Japanese GDP statistics is announced a month-and-half after the end of the quarter. 
The revised, second estimate is announced more than two months after the end of the quarter.  Revisions 
are often very large.  
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days in the second half of January, but all without announcement or confirmation. This was a 
contrast to the previous regime under Mr. Sakakibara and Mr. Kuroda. Interventions without 
announcement, later nicknamed as “stealth intervention” became a hallmark of tactics 
employed by Mr. Mizoguchi.5
 The yen had appreciated sharply from 125 yen toward the end of December 2002 to 
120 yen in the mid-January 2003, so the intervention could have been justified as a 
“smoothing” operation if an announcement had to be made. Moreover, further yen 
appreciation, however “smooth” it might be, was considered to be harmful to a fragile 
economy.  The growth rate of year 2002 was expected to be negative, at the time. As 
explained in the preceding section, the economy at the beginning of 2003 was still considered 
to be very weak, the stock prices were declining, and deflation was worsening.  Another 
financial crisis was feared in the spring of 2003—and indeed the Resona Bank was 
nationalized in May 2003.  Both the speed of yen appreciation and the level of the yen were 
a concern.  Sharp appreciation was viewed not to be consistent with macro fundamentals: 
why should the currency of a very weak economy on the verge of a financial crisis have to 
appreciate?  When the market is taking the currency to the level not consistent with macro 
fundamentals, wouldn’t intervention be a valid policy tool as a signal of displeasure and 
caution, and the currency appreciation, if possible, should be corrected by interventions. 
Interventions from January to March can be explained by this logic. Interventions were 
conducted on and off from January to March 2003, keeping the yen/dollar rate, most of the 
time, in the tight range between 117 and 120 yen/dollar. The market became aware of 
interventions, due to the monthly disclosure of the change in the account that is closely linked 
to intervention. But the market was still left blind about daily details of interventions.  As 
                                                  
5 See Edison (1993) for a survey on the old literature of interventions, which were more or less negative on 
the effectiveness. See Sarno and Taylor (2001) for a survey of recent literature on interventions. 
Dominguez and Frankel (1993), Dominguez (1998, 2003) showed some effectiveness of interventions. See 
also Galati and Merick (2002) for comparative research on interventions by different countries.   
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the intervention details (days of interventions and amounts) of the first quarter were 
announced in May 8, 2003, the public became aware of the switch of intervention policy, to a 
regime of more frequent interventions. The first intervention since end-March was conducted 
on May 8, as the yen appreciated beyond 117.  
 It became clear to market participants in May, that the yen was traded in the narrow 
range between 117 and 120. Interventions were conducted when the yen/dollar rate 
approached 116, but when the yen depreciated toward 119, the interventions were withdrawn.  
This appeared to be a narrow target zone. For example, when the yen was bought to 115.10 
(intra-day high in the Tokyo market) on May 19, 2004, heavy interventions, selling of the yen 
amounting to 1 trillion yen, was conducted and they pushed the yen back to 117 yen/dollar by 
the end of New York market of that day. 
 In May the stock prices reverted from the downward trend to the upward trend.  
The crisis seems to have been averted. Interventions continued, however, as the appreciation 
pressure continued.  Intervention continued in May, June and July, keeping the yen/dollar 
rate most of the time between 116 and 120.  There were 11 intervention days in May, 7 days 
in June, and 9 days in July. 
 By September, the intervention was considered to have been a success in the sense 
that it prevented appreciation that would have pushed the Japanese economy off the recovery 
path.  Stock prices had risen comfortably from the trough in April 2003.  However, from 
June to September, as the Japanese economic recovery seemed to have become more certain, 
and the stock prices rose sharply, criticism from abroad became voiced more frequently: 
Japanese intervention is subsidizing exports, hurting the US manufacturers; Japan with large 
trade surpluses should not intervene; and by preventing appreciation, the pressure of dollar 
decline is burdened, unfairly, by the euro.  
 There was no intervention between July 16 and August 29, 2003.  From July 16 
until August 21, the yen/dollar rate stayed between 118 and 121.  From August 21 to 29, the 
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yen rate appreciated in small steps from 118.00 to 117.00.  Toward the end of August, the 
yen started to appreciate.  In the process that the yen moved toward 117.00 (intra-day high 
in Tokyo), interventions were conducted 412 billion yen on August 29.  
The intervention was carried out on August 29, when the yen appreciated beyond 117.  The 
first defense line at this point seems to be 117.00.6  Once the intervention started, 
interventions continued on and off, for 11 days (out of 13 business days) between August 29 
and September 16.  These interventions were partly countering yen appreciation pressure 
that was built up on the speculation that the United States and Europe increasingly became 
unhappy with Japanese and other Asian countries interventions, including Chinese dollar peg 
policy.  The yen/dollar rate stayed between 116.00 and 118.00. 
 Toward the end of August, criticism of intervention had been circulated in the United 
States and in some European countries. But interventions continued in the first half of 
September.  
 On September 11, Secretary Snow was reportedly to have said that Japan must keep 
intervention minimum.  This stimulated speculation to be long on the yen.  There was a 
large intervention on September 12 to keep the yen at 117.  The interventions continued 
until Tuesday, September 16, but no intervention after September 17.  The yen (New York 
close) started to appreciate from 116.10 on September 16, to 115.20 on September 18, to 
114.00 on September 19, without Japanese interventions. The psychological barrier 
(would-be target zone floor at the time) of 115 yen/dollar was broken.   
 On September 20, 2003, the G7 Finance Minister and Central Bank Governors 
Meeting took place in Dubai. At the conclusion of the G7 Meeting, a communiqué with an 
unusual paragraph was issued.  The statement included a paragraph stating the desirability 
of “flexibility” of the exchange rate:  
                                                  
6 Officials at the Ministry of Finance deny that there was such a defense line, but many 
market participants believed that orders defending a certain level were placed by the 
monetary authorities.  
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We reaffirm that exchange rates should reflect economic fundamentals. We continue 
to monitor exchange markets closely and cooperate as appropriate. In this context, 
we emphasize that more flexibility in exchange rates is desirable for major countries 
or economic areas to promote smooth and widespread adjustments in the 
international financial system, based on market mechanisms. 
 
The market interpreted the paragraph in the communiqué as criticism by the US and 
European countries of the exchange rate policies of China and Japan—massive interventions 
and piling up foreign reserves.7 The yen appreciated to 112.10 yen/dollar on Monday, 
September 22—a jump of 2 yen over the G7 weekend.   
With the disclosed data of interventions, we now know that interventions did not 
take place from September 17 to 29—and rumors of no-intervention had it at the time.  
Many market participants thought that the Japanese authorities were told by other G7 
countries not to intervene.  The Japanese authorities publicly said that there had been no 
change in the Japanese exchange rate policy.  But still the investors were moving cautiously 
toward yen appreciation.  Only when the yen dollar rate approached 110 yen/dollar rate, the 
intervention of September 30 was conducted with force (Selling of 1 trillion yen in the day) 
and prominence (intervening in the New York market as well, according to the market), as if 
the Japanese authorities wanted to show a license to intervene.  
 Heavy interventions continued in the fourth quarter of 2003. Despite intervention, 
the yen/dollar rate rose gradually from 110 to 105. Many market participants thought that the 
intervention policy may not have been changed, but the defense line was retrieving, first from 
115 to 110 at the time of September G7, and then from 110 to 105 by the end of December 
2003.8
                                                  
7 Japanese officials privately argue that the paragraph of communiqué is directed at China, but not Japan.  
However, several officials in Europe, when publicly asked, did not deny an interpretation that the 
paragraph is applicable also to Japan. 
8 Again, no officials even privately confirm such a defense line interpretation.  
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 Interventions from January to March 2004 were extremely frequent and heavy again.  
The Japanese authorities sold about 15 trillion yen during the first three months of 2004.  
The yen/dollar rate was kept from appreciating beyond 103.  
 The Japanese authorities intervened on 18 days out of 21 business days in January 
2004. (The authorities intervened even on the days when the Japanese financial markets were 
on holidays—January 2 and 12.) The per-day intervention amount ranged from 2 billion yen 
on January 26 to 1,664 billion yen on January 9. The size of the January intervention 
amounted to be 7 trillion yen—a record high for one month.  The intervention amount rivals 
the amount of intervention in the third quarter of 2003.   
 Another G7 took place on February 7, 2004. The communiqué basically repeated the 
same paragraph as the one of September 2003, but added one sentence and one clause (as 
underlined):    
 
We reaffirm that exchange rates should reflect economic fundamentals. Excess 
volatility and disorderly movements in exchange rates are undesirable for economic 
growth. We continue to monitor exchange markets closely and cooperate as 
appropriate. In this context, we emphasize that more flexibility in exchange rates is 
desirable for major countries or economic areas that lack such flexibility to promote 
smooth and widespread adjustments in the international financial system, based on 
market mechanisms. 
 
The second sentence was interpreted by the market participants as endorsement to 
Japanese intervention if it was to reduce “excess” volatility.  The additional clause of “that 
lack such flexibility” qualified the “major countries or economic areas.” Since the yen has 
appreciated by about 14% in the 14 months period prior to this statement, the market 
interpreted that the qualification excluded Japan from “major countries” that are urged to 
allow flexibility.  This time, the market participants took it as the endorsement of the 
Japanese intervention policy between the two meetings by G7.  
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 In February, the Japanese authorities continued heavy intervention, 18 days out of 20 
business days, but the amount was less than half of January. In March, the Japanese 
authorities intervened from March 1 to March 16, every business day but one (March 12).  
In particular, on March 5, more than 1 trillion yen was sold, and the yen/dollar rate apparently 
pushed up from 108 yen/dollar to 111 yen/dollar. On March 8, more than 800 billion yen was 
sold again, to push the rate to 112 yen/dollar (intraday low of the yen in Tokyo).  Pushing 
the dollar up (rather than preventing the dollar from going down (lean-against-the-wind) 
raised some eyebrows in Japan and the United States.9 In retrospect, it can be argued that the 
monetary authorities tried to push the yen to depreciate to create a room for flexibility above 
100 yen before terminating intervention.10  
 Interventions abruptly ended on March 16, 2004, after intervening 11 days out of 12 
business days in the first half of the month.  No intervention after March 17 was conducted 
without any announcement of not doing interventions—the information was again not 
disclosed until May 12, 2004.  The market was guessing whether stealth intervention 
continued or not in the second half of March and throughout April.11 The yen appreciated up 
to 103 yen/dollar toward the end of the month, but it changed the direction and started to 
depreciate, without intervention. The exit was completed.  
 In April, there was a debate in the policy circle that the monetary authorities may 
have caused a loss to the Japanese people, by intervening a lot and the yen/dollar rate 
appreciated beyond the intervention point.  At the end of March, unrealized losses from 
intervention operations in the last fourteen years were estimated to have exceeded 1 trillion 
yen. The usual rebuttal to this criticism is that in the case of Japanese intervention, the 
                                                  
9 Newspaper has noticed the large amount of intervention, and commented that it would be difficult to get 
out of large interventions. (Asahi Shinbun, March 9, 2004; page 11)  
10 In other words, this interpretation is that the authorities wanted to score an insurance run before finishing 
the game. 
11 Although the monthly aggregate of April was disclosed at the end of April, with no intervention record, 
so that the market knew as of the end-April, that intervention did not take place in April, but the market did 
not know about the details of intervention in the second half of March, until the May 12 disclosure. 
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operation is like borrowing at zero interest rate and invest in dollar securities with 1% to 2% 
coupon rates, the interest income more than compensate the unrealized losses.   
 The total amount of interventions during the fifteen months from January 2003 to 
March 2004 reached roughly 35 trillion yen, or US$ 320 billion. (From April to July 2004, 
there has been no intervention since March 16, and the yen fluctuated mostly at around 
108-110 until October 2004.)  
 
4. Why so much for so long? 
4.1. Fighting Speculators 
In general, interventions tend to occur when the exchange rate changes are large and moving 
toward the direction that the authorities consider inconsistent with macro fundamentals.  
Relationship between macro fundamentals and interventions were closely examined in 
Section 2. In an analysis with macro fundamentals with monthly observations, interventions 
from January 2003 to August 2003 can be understood as helping economic recovery by 
preventing sharp yen appreciation.  However, this explanation may not apply after 
September 2003, especially in the fourth quarter of 2003 and the first quarter of 2004, as 
many macro variables were showing signs of economic recovery. In this section, I will add 
another explanations for those interventions after August 2003.   
 It appeared to the market and researchers that the “defense line” was retreated from 
the 116 level before the G7 of September to the 110 level after the G7, since the first 
intervention after the G7 was carried out on September 30, when the yen became the 110 
level (110.48 at 5pm in the Tokyo market).  However, this retreat made the speculative 
forces to be reinforced.  Although what is speculative position is difficult to estimate, one of 
the indicators is the net long position of the currency futures in the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (IMM).   
 Figure 1 shows the weekly data of net long yen position in IMM and interventions, 
from January 2003 to June 2004.  First, the correlation seems to be clear: when net long 
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positions become large (positive), then intervention tended to occur selling the yen (positive 
direction).  (Note that the units of accounts of left and right scales are different.  For IMM, 
it is the number of units of transactions at the exchange, while for intervention, it is in 100 
million yen.) Second, the net long position suddenly became large in August 2003, and 
continued to be large until mid-February 2004. This corresponds to the period of heavy 
intervention, except the four weeks from mid-February to mid-March, when intervention 
continued while net long positions disappeared (in fact, it turned net short position). It could 
be possible to argue that interventions from September 2003 to March 2004 were fighting 
speculative pressures.  
 
[Figure 1:  Futures Position and Intervention] 
 
4.2 Reaction Function 
Ito (2003) showed that the Japanese interventions can be explained by a reaction function that 
include the recent changes of the exchange rate, the deviation from the long-run averages.  
Below I propose the additional term involving the net long position of the yen in the IMM. 
 “Smoothing operations” refer to interventions that would make changes slower but 
not necessarily with an intention to stop the movement or reverse the trend. This may be 
captured by the variables such as the change of preceding day, (st-1 - st-2), where st is the log of 
yen/dollar rate on day t. Even when the exchange rate moves quickly, if the movement is in 
the direction that is desirable (from the viewpoint of the monetary authorities), then 
interventions would not be triggered.  In other words, interventions are more likely to occur 
if the exchange rate are moving away from the long-term equilibrium, whether the long-term 
equilibrium can be determined by the long-term backward moving average, (st-1 - sMAt-1).  
Since interventions tend to occur in clusters, the lagged interventions may have some 
explanatory power.  In the end, we have the following specification for the intervention 





ttttt IMMIMMIMMIMMIntssssInt νφφφφφ +<+>++−+−= −−−−− )0(1)0(1)()( 5413112211  
 
where l(X>0) and l(X<0) are indicator functions.  This specification allows the asymmetric 
response of the monetary authorities.   
 Weekly IMM positions survey are taken on Tuesday and made public on Friday. There are two 
possibilities on how the information can be known to the Japanese monetary authorities. The monetary 
authorities, by collecting information from the market on the market conditions including position taking 
of large financial institutions, might be able to guess more or less the net long/short positions on the yen in 
real time. If the monetary authorities know in real time the IMM position by communication with the 
market, then it is appropriate to model the weekly intervention based on Tuesday.  If the monetary 
authorities are as ignorant as the public, then it is more appropriate to base the weekly model on the 
Friday-to-Friday periodicity. The truth would be in between.  Two models are estimated, one on the 
Tuesday periodicity and the Friday periodicity. 
 Results, shown in Table 4, can be interpreted as follows: φ1 > 0 implies that the 
yen-selling intervention tends to occur if the yen appreciated the day before (from the two 
days earlier);  φ4 > 0 implies that yen-selling interventions tend to occur if IMM net long 
positions becomes large, an evidence of fighting against yen appreciation pressures exerted 
by speculators; and φ5 < 0 implies that yen-selling interventions tend to occur when the net 
short position becomes large, reflecting the yen depreciation pressure.  It shows that the 
monetary authorities did respond to IMM, but with asymmetric reactions.  When the yen 
long position is large, interventions were conducted to fight it to prevent appreciation, and the 
yen short position is developed, the monetary authorities also take advantage to push the yen 
to depreciate it. The latter was most prominent from mid-February to mid-March 2004. The 
authorities have conducted both lean-against interventions and lean-in interventions, to cause 




An interpretation of the intervention episode of January 2003 to March 2004 is that it helped 
the economy recover from a depth of recession to a growth path, not in the sense that it 
actively depreciated the yen but in the sense that it slowed down the pace of yen appreciation.  
The growth rate increased from negative territory in 2002 to at or above the potential growth 
rate in 2003-04, and the stock price increased by 50% from April 2003 to April 2004.  If 
helping an economic recovery was an objective, it was certainly achieved the objective. 
 Anther test of evaluating intervention is the tactical effectiveness issue. If slowing 
down the yen appreciation was the objective, whether intervention did have in impact on the 
exchange rate on the day of intervention.  Ito (2003) proposed a method of evaluating the 
effectiveness of Japanese intervention. The change in the daily exchange rate is regressed on 
the change in the past exchange rate (lagged once, and the cumulative change for a week in 
the past, and deviation from the long-run average) and interventions (Japanese intervention, 
US intervention, and Japanese first-of-the-week intervention).12 The specification looks like 
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where s t = s t -s t-1, s t is the NY close of the yen/dollar exchange rate, and sMA is the 
long-run, here 180 days, backward moving average.  The first three terms in the 
right-hand-side are supposed to capture movement of the yen/dollar rate without 
interventions.  If one strongly believes that the exchange rate follows a random walk, then a 
condition β0 =β1=β2=0, should be imposed. However, in general, a short-rum bandwagon 
effect (0<β1<1) and a medium run mean-reversion (β2<0) may be present, and this 
                                                  
12 See Dominguez and Frankel (1993), Dominguez (2003), Sarno and Taylor (2001) for 
general references on the effectiveness of interventions. This specification follows Ito (2003).  
See Truman (2003) for a skeptical view on the effectiveness of interventions. 
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specification allows for such behavior. Int t is the Japanese intervention amounts; IntUS t is 
the US intervention amounts (in the yen).  IntIN t denotes the first-in-the-week interventions 
(that is the cross of the indicator function of no intervention in the past five days and Int t): 
IntIN t = Int t if Int t≠0 and Int t-1 =Int t-2 =…=Int t-5 =0, or, otherwise, IntIN t =0.  This term is 
to capture the power of infrequent, “surprise” interventions, as opposed to continuous 
interventions. Interventions are often done in clusters.  Namely, one intervention tends to be 
followed by others. This can be explained by the fact that political costs for interventions 
(obtaining an approval and forming consensus carries bureaucratic costs) can be lowered 
once intervention is done. (See Ito and Yabu (2004) for specifying seriously this line of 
thoughts.)    
 The equation is now estimated for the three subperiods (pre-Sakakibara, 
Sakakibara-Kuroda, and Mizoguchi). The results are shown in Table 5.  
 
[Table 5:  Effectiveness] 
 
Interventions were effective in that the yen-selling interventions depreciated the yen, and the 
yen-buying interventions appreciated the yen in the second and third subperiods. 
Effectiveness of the interventions (β3) was halved in period 3 compared to period 2: 
One-trillion yen interventions depreciated only 0.7% in the second period and 0.38% in the 
third period.  Moreover, one trillion yen first-time-in-a-week intervention (effects of β3+β5) 
depreciated the yen by 2.1 percent in the second sub-period (1995-2003), while it depreciated 
the yen only by 0.45% in the third period (2003-2004). In sum, the interventions were 
effective in the Mizoguchi stealth interventions but the degree of impact declined to the level 
of 1/2 in general, and 1/5 in first-time-in-a-week interventions.   
 Taking these estimates and multiply by 35 (the amount of intervention in the 15 
months), we have an estimate of 13% depreciation (from the level otherwise). (Assuming 
0.38% of depreciation per 1 trillion yen, 35 x 0.38 = 13.3% depreciation.)  In other words, 
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by selling 35 trillion yen, the Japanese authorities achieved the range from 105 to 115 in the 
spring-summer of 2004, rather than 90 to 100.   
 We can think of several reasons for the decline in the effectiveness in the third period, 
compared to the second period.  First, stealth intervention may be a worse tactics.  If 
signaling was to be given, then announcement of the fact that interventions are carried should 
amplify the effect. The weight of intervention in the total turnovers every day is very small 
even with a large intervention.  So, any effect has to be working on the expectation of the 
market participants.  Intervention cannot be very much effective if the fact of interventions 
is deliberately kept confidential. Second, too frequent interventions may reduce the 
effectiveness of intervention. Surprise intervention is highly effective by sending new 
information to the market.  However, continuous interventions do not convey any 
information to the market.  Third, the market detected disagreement—whether true or 
false—between the Japanese and other G7 authorities over the desirability of the Japanese 
interventions. This was most highlighted in August-September 2003. The fact that speculative 
positions were built up so much in late August 2003 was the result of this. In a sense, the 
Japanese authorities kept intervening from September 2003 to March 2004 to reverse 
expectations of speculators (broadly defined). In the meantime, more interventions did not 
move the rate. The fact that interventions stopped soon after net long positions disappeared in 
Chicago attest this interpretation. Fourth, suppose that the Japanese authorities were 
defending a particular rate, which they deny.  Then the success means that the rate does not 
move.  The fact that econometric results shows no effect on the exchange rate when 
interventions were carried out is not a sign of ineffectiveness but a sign of effectiveness.  In 
the sense, the regression is miss-specified, if the objective was to defend the line but not to 
rebound.   
 
4.4. Cost of Intervention 
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Usually, large-scale interventions to sell the domestic currencies, and building up large 
foreign reserves, are considered to be too costly, often in the context of developing countries, 
where the domestic interest rate is higher than the U.S. interest rate.  However, in the case of 
Japan, the domestic interest rate was significantly lower than the US interest rate. Therefore 
funding intervention by issuing yen-denominated Financial Bills (FBs) and purchasing US 
Treasury Bills and US Treasury Bonds has been a profitable operation. Ito (2003) estimated 
such net interest revenues, amounting to a total of 4.6 trillion yen, from 1991 to 2002:Q1. 
When the same calculation is extended to the end of 2004:Q1, the cumulative net interest 
income amounted to 5.4 trillion yen. In particular, since 1999, the funding cost of FBs has 
been virtually zero, reflecting the zero interest rate policy of the Bank of Japan. Any interest 
incomes generated by assets, that is, mostly US government securities, are net interest income. 
The increase in the cumulative intervention becomes higher, interest incomes become higher.   
 Another possible risk of intervention is to deplete the foreign reserves, when the 
monetary authorities are selling the foreign assets. However, in Japan, the direction of 
intervention has been to purchase the foreign assets, since 1998, so that theoretically, there is 
no limit for such an operation. Therefore, Japanese interventions were not costly on either 
front.   
 The realized gains and unrealized gains at the end of each quarter from 2002:Q1 to 
2004:Q1 are calculated. Cumulative realized gains, cumulative unrealized losses, and 
cumulative interest income are shown in the first three columns of Table 6.  The yen/dollar 
rate at the end of each quarter and inventory cost is also shown in the table. 
 
[Table 6:  Profit/Cost of Intervention] 
 
One may point out possible cost of intervention in terms of realized and unrealized losses 
from trading and holdings of foreign currency denominated assets, if the yen further 
appreciates from the average inventory cost of foreign securities. Ito (2003) estimated that the 
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average inventory cost of foreign securities holding (those as a result of intervention since 
April 1991) at the end of 2002:Q1, was about 106 yen/dollar, and unrealized gains were about 
5 trillion yen with the market rate of 132 yen/dollar.  At the end of 2002:Q4, the inventory 
cost rose to 109 yen/dollar, and the unrealized gains shrank to 2.2 trillion yen.  As a result of 
heavy interventions from January 2003 to March 2004, the inventory cost rose to 110 
yen/dollar.  The market rate became 104 yen/dollar, and the unrealized valuation turned 
losses of 3.3 trillion yen. Since no yen-purchase intervention was conducted since 1998, 
realized gains remained the same since 1998.  However, the total profit/loss of intervention 
operations (sum of interest income, realized gains and unrealized gains) since 1999 show 
about 3 trillion yen of profits at the end of 2004. 
 
4.5. Consistency with Monetary Policy 
In order to fight deflation, the Bank of Japan has adopted the zero interest rate policy.13 
Funding for 35 trillion yen operations were virtually at no borrowing costs, while investing in 
the U.S. papers carried 2 to 3 % interest rates depending on the maturities. Therefore, the 
more foreign reserves, the more net interest income.14  
 When deflation is a problem, a little bit of inflationary pressure resulting from 
unsterilized intervention is no harm. In fact, Svensson (2001) advocated unsterilized, 
unlimited intervention as a fool-proof way of getting out of intervention in Japan. Since the 
institutional framework for intervention in Japan—issuing fiscal bills to obtain yen cash and 
intervene to purchase foreign securities—guarantees the automatic sterilization, the Bank of 
Japan have to expand monetary base in tandem of interventions if unsterilized intervention 
have to be pursued.  Although there was no explicit cooperation for unsterilized intervention 
from the Bank of Japan, the monetary base was expanded in 2003, unlike the earlier episode. 
                                                  
13 See Ito and Mishkin (2004) on this appraisal of the Japanese monetary policy in the last twenty years. 
14 This positive spread has been the case since 1992.  The cumulative interest income from positions built 
by interventions from 1991 to 2002 are estimated to be around 4 trillion yen, see Ito (2003).   
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This was implemented by the increase in the target of the current account at the Bank of 
Japan, that is, effectively excess reserves.15  For the first half of 2003, there were some 
similarities in the increase in the cumulative intervention and cumulative increase in 
monetary base, as shown in Figure 2. However, this was probably no more than 
coincidence.16
 
[Figure 2: Unsterilized intervention] 
 
The point is that interventions themselves are no cost or constraint to monetary policy in the 
deflationary environment in 2003, whether or not the Bank of Japan was willing to expand 
monetary base.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper reviewed the experiences of Japanese macroeconomic development and 
intervention from 2001 to 2004, with an emphasis on the experience from January 2003 to 
March 2004.  The regime changed in January 2003 from infrequent, large-scale intervention 
to infrequent, large scale interventions.  The regime change coincided with the change in the 
personnel in charge of intervention. Japanese Interventions tended to occur when there is 
sharp appreciation of the yen, when macro fundamentals are weak, and when speculative 
positions were built up in 2003 and 2004.   
                                                  
15 See Ito (2004b) for the political economy of the relationship between the Bank of Japan and the Ministry 
of Finance. 
16 Deputy Governor commented on the rough correspondence between intervention amounts and 
additional monetary base increases on October 1, 2003, as follows: “The amount of intervention so far this 
year is 13.5 trillion yen, while the additional liquidity supplied by the Bank of Japan this year has been 10 
trillion yen.  Although it was coincidence, the amount of additional liquidity supply and intervention 
amounts were approximately equal.  The combination of intervention and additional domestic liquidity 
has, ex post, the same effect as the unsterilized intervention.  Or, again, ex post, the combination has the 
same effect as the purchase of US government bonds by the Bank of Japan.” (Emphasis added by the 
author) 
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 Since the economy got back to a growth track in 2004, interventions to prevent 
premature yen appreciation can be regarded as a success in general.  Costs of large scale 
interventions was small in the environment of slow growth, zero interest rate, and deflation.  
However, looking into more tactical issues, the effectiveness of interventions was much less 
in this episode of interventions. One of the reasons for the loss of effectiveness is due to the 
stealth intervention and due to too frequent interventions.  Since the intervention started in 
January 2003 at the level that was far above the average inventory cost of accumulated 
intervention, the average inventory cost became higher.  Also the appearance of losing a 
battle toward the end of September contributed to inviting more speculative yen-long 
positions by speculators.  Interventions from October 2003 to March 2004 were basically to 
fight off these speculative positions rather than the traditional reason of preventing yen 
appreciation in the backdrop of the weak economy.  With all these caveats, the exit was 
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Figure 1:  Futures Position and Intervention 
 
 

















































































































Figure 2: Unsterilized intervention 
 
 



































































Table 1: Views of the Bank of Japan on the economy 
 
2001 Bank of Japan, Monthly Reports, Opening Paragraph BOJ view 
Jan Japan's economy continues to recover gradually, but the pace is 
slowing due to decelerating export growth.  
+0.5
Feb Japan's economy continues to recover gradually, but the pace is 
slowing due to decelerating export growth.  
+0.5
Mar The recovery in Japan's economy has recently come to a pause, 
reflecting a decrease in exports. 
0.0
Apr Adjustments in economic activities have been under way, as 
production is declining reflecting a fall in exports.  
-0.5
May Adjustments in economic activities have been under way, as 
production is declining reflecting a fall in exports. 
-0.5
Jun Adjustments in economic activities are gradually intensifying, as 
production is declining substantially reflecting a fall in exports. 
-1.0
July Adjustments in economic activities are intensifying, as production 
is declining substantially reflecting a fall in exports. 
-1.0
Aug Adjustments in economic activities are intensifying further, 
reflecting a substantial decline in exports and production. 
-1.0
Sept Adjustments in economic activity are becoming more severe, as 
the substantial decline in production, starting from a fall in exports, 
is beginning to have a negative influence on employment and 
income conditions.  
-1.5
Oct Adjustments in economic activity are becoming more severe, as 
the substantial decline in production has a negative influence on 
employment and income conditions. In addition, the terrorist 
attacks in the U.S. have further heightened uncertainty in Japan's 
economy. 
-1.5
Nov Adjustments in economic activity are becoming more severe, as 
the substantial decline in production is beginning to have an 
adverse effect on private consumption through decreases in 
employment and income. 
-1.5
Dec Japan's economy is deteriorating broadly, as private consumption 






2002  BOJ view 
Jan Japan's economy is deteriorating broadly, as private consumption is 
weakening in addition to a decline in exports and business fixed 
investment. 
-2.0
Feb Japan's economy continues to deteriorate. -2.0
Mar Japan's economy still continues to deteriorate as a whole, although the 
downward pressure from exports and inventories is gradually abating. 
-1.5
Apr Japan's economy still continues to deteriorate as a whole, but the pace 
has moderated somewhat. 
-1.0
May The pace of deterioration in Japan's economy has moderated, with 
production starting to pick up reflecting the increase in exports and 
progress in inventory adjustment. 
-1.0
Jun Japan's economy shows signs of stabilizing with a distinct increase in 
exports and a pick-up in production, although domestic private demand 
remains weak. 
-0.5
July Japan's economy, despite continued weakness in domestic demand, has 
almost stabilized as a whole with an increasing upward impetus from 
exports and production, and an improvement in corporate profits and 
business sentiment. 
0.0
Aug Japan's economy, despite persistent weakness in domestic demand and 
increasing uncertainty regarding the global economy, has almost 
stabilized as a whole with exports and production continuing to 
increase. 
0.0
Sept Japan's economy, despite persistent weakness in domestic demand and 
large uncertainty regarding the global economy, has almost stabilized 
as a whole with exports and production continuing to increase. 
0.0
Oct Japan's economy has stabilized as a whole, but clear signs of recovery 
have not yet been observed partly due to large uncertainty regarding 
the global economy. 
0.0
Nov Japan's economy has stabilized as a whole, but there is greater 
uncertainty toward recovery. 
0.0
Dec Japan's economy has stabilized as a whole, but there is still substantial 





2003  BoJ view 
Jan Japan's economy has stabilized as a whole, but there is still 
substantial uncertainty about the prospects for a recovery. 
0.0
Feb Economic activity remains flat amid substantial uncertainty about 
the outlook for the economy. 
0.0
Mar Economic activity remains flat amid substantial uncertainty about 
the outlook for the economy.  
0.0
Apr Economic activity remains flat as a whole, despite some signs of 
improvement, with greater uncertainty about the economic outlook 
partly due to Iraq-related developments. 
0.0
May Economic activity remains flat as a whole, but there is greater 
uncertainty about the economic outlook. 
0.0
Jun Economic activity remains virtually flat as a whole, although 
exports are currently showing some weakness. 
0.0
July Economic activity remains virtually flat. 0.0
Aug Economic activity remains virtually flat. 0.0
Sept Economic activity still continues to be virtually flat as a whole, 
although signs of improvement have been observed in such areas as 
the environment for exports.  
0.0
Oct The foundation for a gradual recovery in Japan's economy is being 
laid, as the environment for exports and business sentiment have 
improved.  
0.5
Nov Japan's economy is starting to recover gradually. 0.5




2004  BoJ view 
Jan Japan's economy is recovering gradually. 0.5
Feb Japan's economy is recovering gradually. 0.5
Mar Japan's economy is recovering gradually. 0.5
Apr Japan's economy continues to recover gradually, and domestic 
demand is becoming firmer. 
0.5
May Japan's economy continues to recover gradually, and domestic 
demand is becoming firmer. 
0.5
Jun Japan's economy continues to recover, and the increases in 




BoJ view of the direction of the economy: Author’s interpretation of Bank of Japan opening 
statements of the monthly report, on the direction of the economy, from –2.0 to +2.0.  The 
original monthly reports are available from the Bank of Japan homepage: 
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/seisaku/0*/seisak_f.htm, where t=1,2,3,4. 
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 2001Ja 13,843.55 0.4 116.38 1.3 0.5 0 1692
12,883.54 116.44 0.1 0.5 0 - 33414
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May 13,262.14 119.06 0 1929
n 12,969.05 124.27 4.4 0 85
l
-4.8 -4.0 -0.5 -1.0 
-2.2 -1.0 -4.4 -0.9 Ju
y 11,860.77 124.79 0.4 0 18087-8.5 -1.0 -0.9 Ju
g 10,713.51 118.92 0 - 5095-9.7 -4.7 -1.0 -0.9 Au
Sept 9,774.68 119.29 0.3 -31455 23625
10,366.34 6.1 121.84 2.1 0 11146
10,697.44 3.2 123.98 1.8 0 16276
Dec 10,542.62 131.47 6.0 0 60646
2002Ja 9,997.80 132.94 1.1 0 46394
Feb 10,587.83 5.9 133.89 0.7 0 - 14655
Ma
-8.8 -1.5 -3.2 -0.8 
-1.5 -0.7 
-1.5 -0.8 
-1.4 -2.0 -2.7 -0.9 




r 11,024.94 4.1 132.71 0 45330
A
-0.9 -1.5 -2.4 -0.7 
pr 11,492.54 4.2 127.97 0 38900
Ma
-3.6 -1.0 -0.9 
y 11,763.70 2.4 123.96 -21174 - 42164
Jun 10,621.84 119.22 5.1 -18750 - 13897
Jul
-3.1 -1.0 -0.8 
-9.7 -3.8 -0.5 -0.8 
y 9,877.94 119.82 0.5 0.0 0 6474
Au
-7.0 -0.8 
g 9,619.30 117.97 0.0 0 75
Se
-2.6 -1.5 -0.9 
pt 9,383.29 121.79 3.2 0.0 4.1 0 - 3412
Oct 8,640.48 122.48 0.6 0.0 0 1830
Nov 9,215.56 6.7 122.44 0.0 0 34701
Dec 8,578.95 119.37 0.0 0.7 0 55444
2003Ja 8,339.94 119.21 0.0 -6781 4224





-6.9 -2.5 -0.7 
-2.8 -0.1 -0.8 
-1.2 -0.7 
r 7,972.71 119.02 1.1 0.0 -5518 36185
A
-4.7 -0.1 -0.6 
pr 7,831.42 119.46 0.4 0.0 0 48986
Ma
-1.8 -0.4 
y 8,424.51 7.6 118.63 0.0 -38997 - 1898




y 9,563.21 5.3 120.11 0.2 0.0 -20271 8731
Au
-0.2 
g 10,343.55 8.2 117.13 0.0 -4124 1085
Se
-2.5 -0.1
pt 10,219.05 110.48 0.0 2.2 -51116 - 1116
Oct 10,559.59 3.3 108.99 0.5 -16687 - 321
Nov 10,100.57 109.34 0.3 0.5 -15872 7351
Dec 10,676.64 5.7 106.97 0.5 7.6 0.0 -26196 31629
2004Ja 10,783.61 1.0 105.88 0.5 -68215 8329







r 11,715.39 6.1 103.95 0.5 6.4 -45332 668
A
-4.7 -0.1
pr 11,761.79 0.4 110.44 6.2 0.5 0 1720
Ma
-0.2
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Notes and Sources: 
BoJ view: Author’s interpretation of Bank of Japan opening statements of the monthly 
report, on the direction of the economy, from –2.0 to +2.0.  The original monthly 
reports are available from the Bank of Japan homepage: 
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/seisaku/0*/seisak_f.htm, where t=1,2,3,4. 
Stock: The percentage change in the Nikkei stock price index from the end of month 
t-1 to the end of month t. The level is available from the Bank of Japan homepage: 
http://www.boj.or.jp/stat/dlong_f.htm 
Yen: The percentage change in the yen/dollar rate from the end of month t-1 to the end 
of month t.  Negative numbers imply yen appreciation. The level is available from the 
Bank of Japan homepage: http://www.boj.or.jp/stat/dlong_f.htm 
Intervention: The aggregated amounts of yen/dollar intervention in the month, 
excluding the yen/euro interventions. Negative numbers imply yen-selling, 
dollar-purchasing interventions. The original data are available at the Ministry of 
Finance homepage:  
http://www.mof.go.jp/english/e1c021.htm   
GDP: The real GDP growth rate, annualized rates of quarter to quarter changes. The 
quarterly GDP is seasonally adjusted.   
The GDP statistics are available from Cabinet Office: 
http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/menu.html 
Inflation: The percentage change in the CPI excluding fresh food.  CPI is available 











Table 3:  Intervention Regimes before and after January 2003 
 








Smallest Largest  
2001Q3 3,210.7 7 449.4 94.3 1,287.4  
2001Q4 0   
2002Q1 0   
2002Q2 4,016.2 7 570.3 94.3 1,287.4  
2002Q3 0   
2002Q4 0   
2003Q1 2,386.7 17 134.8 0.4 361.5  
2003Q2 4,611.6 18 251.6 7.0 1,040.1  
2003Q3 7,551.2 21 359.6 23.6 1,066.7  
2003Q4 5,875.5 26 226.0 0.1 1,283.8  
2004Q1 14,831.4 47 315.6 2.1 1,666.4  
2004Q2 0   
Notes: Calculation by the author 
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OBS 64 63 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors are given in 
parentheses. 
  †Statistically significant at the 10-percent level. 
  *Statistically significant at the 5-percent level.  
 **Statistically significant at the 1-percent level 
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R2 0.0031 0.0068 0.0037 
＃Obs 1101 1962 308 
Estimated with a GARCH model. ** statistically significant at the 1-percent level.  
* statistically significant at the 5-percent level. † statistically significant at 10-percent level.  
 








Table 6:  Profit/Cost of Intervention 
 




















02.1 9962.7 50547.0 45634.3 106144.0 1926.7 132.7 106.5
02.2 9962.7 23816.2 46857.1 80636.1 2251.9 119.4 108.8
02.3 9962.7 28770.3 47958.0 86691.0 2251.9 121.6 108.8
02.4 9962.7 22239.9 48872.8 81075.4 2251.9 118.7 108.8
03.1 9962.7 20727.9 49710.8 80401.4 2446.6 118.0 109.5
03.2 9962.7 26262.6 50576.7 86802.0 2835.2 119.8 110.5
03.3 9962.7 -282.0 51515.1 61195.8 3484.2 111.5 111.6
03.4 9962.7 -15940.1 52517.5 46540.1 4024.1 107.3 111.2
04.1 9962.7 -33142.3 53924.8 30745.2 5400.7 104.2 110.3
See Ito (2003) for precise definitions of each item. 
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